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Abstract 
 
Since 2010, successive Conservative-led Coalition and Conservative governments in the UK 
have imposed domestic austerity while maintaining foreign aid commitments. They have 
done so in the teeth of considerable hostility from influential sections of the media, many 
Conservative MPs and party members, and large sections of the voting public. This paper 
explains this apparently paradoxical position by analysing these governments’ increasingly 
explicit stance that aid serves ‘the national interest’ in a variety of ways. While not a new 
message from donors, post-2010 Conservative governments have significantly strengthened 
this narrative, with the (uncertain) intent of legitimising foreign aid expenditure.    
 
Introduction 
 
In 2010 a Conservative-led coalition with the Liberal Democrats displaced ‘New Labour’ from 
government in the United Kingdom after 13 years in power. In 2014, the Conservative Party 
achieved a narrow electoral majority to become the sole party of government. In 2016, 
following the Brexit referendum, a new Conservative government was formed under Prime 
Minister Theresa May. All three administrations have imposed/maintained deep budget 
cuts. The cuts have been justified as a necessary corrective to perceived New Labour 
profligacy, dangerously exposed by the global financial crisis (GFC). Critics, on the other 
hand, argue that austerity is being driven by an opportunistic, ideological restructuring of 
the British economy and society in the interests of deepening uneven capital accumulation 
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(Kitson et al 2011; Hamnett 2014; Beatty and Fothergill 2014; Dorling 2015; Bale and Webb 
2015). Puzzling, indeed angering to many, these governments chose to protect the foreign 
aid budget (more properly termed Overseas Development Assistance: ODA), to the extent 
that the UK met the historic commitment of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) for the 
very first time in 2014. This was despite sustained hostility amongst many Conservative 
Members of Parliament (MPs), very influential sections of the media, and large numbers of 
the British public (Heppell and Lightfoot 2012; Tucket 2015). The commitment to UK foreign 
aid against a backdrop of painful austerity appears at first to present a considerable political 
paradox. Indeed, in a recent academic article examining public opinion and foreign aid cuts 
in the context of economic crises, Heinrich et al (2016) pick out the UK as an anomalous case 
amongst EU donors, and acknowledge that they are unable to explain why aid has been 
sustained. While current legislation commits UK governments to spending 0.7% GNI on 
foreign aid, previous governments have failed to meet this target without facing particular 
sanction, and had they wished, recent Conservative governments could have pursued 
legislative change. The decision to ring fence ODA runs counter to arguments that foreign 
aid is an external projection of national redistribution inclinations and mechanisms, whereby 
higher levels of aid correlate with states that have higher commitments to domestic social 
welfare (e.g. Thérien and Noël 1994), which is certainly not true of current UK trends. 
Remarkably, the decision to honour the formal commitment to the 0.7% target (the 
question of how this is spent is a different question, and addressed later) was reaffirmed by 
Prime Minister May in April 2017. This is despite the fact that, in contrast to their respective 
predecessors, Prime Minister May and the Secretary of State for International Development, 
Priti Patel, have been comparatively unenthusiastic towards many forms of UK aid spending, 
and the role of DfID in particular. For the moment though, while substantive changes may 
take place within aid policy and expenditure, the insistence on aid serving the national 
interest is being made ever more explicitly under May and Patel. 
 
The increasingly forceful insistence on aid serving the national interest is a corollary of the 
narrative that aid works in the mutual interests of the UK and its partners/recipients, 
something explored in depth by Keijzer and Lundsgaarde (2017). In other words, national 
interests are presented as aligned with donors ‘doing good’ in the world, in a ‘win-win’ 
projection more usually associated with South-South framings of development partnership. 
These claims to national interest are context dependent: they vary in relation to different 
parts of the aid portfolio, including domestic and overseas refugee spending, long term 
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development commitments, private sector investments, conflict-related spending, and so 
on. Claims about the rationalities and realpolitik of aid are also pitched differently to 
different audiences – publics, parliamentarians, business people and so on. It should come 
as no surprise that their respective public justifications are diverse, or that claims that aid 
serves national interests are not new in practice or discourse. Donors have always pursued a 
variety of domestic interests through foreign aid and international development activities, 
some quite openly and some less transparently (Lancaster 2007; Milne and Tingley 2010; 
Essex 2013; Lundsgaarde 2013; Roberts 2014; Brown et al 2015; Hulme 2016; Kim and Gray 
2016). This paper examines how and why the last three Conservative-led/Conservative 
governments have insisted on a much stronger and more explicit version of this narrative. 
The UK is not alone in this, but is reflective of an emphatic trend in wider foreign aid 
narratives discussed further in the conclusions (Breman 2011; Mawdsley 2015a; Keijzer and 
Lundsgaarde 2017).  
 
The paper assumes the following conceptual conditions. The first is that there can be no 
singular or static account of the various norms and interests that shape policy decisions 
around foreign aid, not least because of its multidimensional nature: foreign aid takes many 
different forms, and performs many functions across different sites and scales (Glennie 
2008). The second is that the institutional structures within which policy-making around 
foreign aid and development interventions take place are diverse and complex: aid 
establishments are not single actors or agents (Lancaster 2007; Essex 2014). Third, the 
context within which policy decisions take place are dynamic, rarely more so than at 
present. The international development landscape is in a moment of turbulent change due 
to the ‘rising powers’ and ascendency of South-South cooperation (UNDP 2013), the 
changing global geographies of poverty and wealth (Sumner and Mallett 2012), attempts by 
the established donors to move to a ‘beyond aid’ agenda (Janus et al 2014), and particularly 
for the UK, following the Brexit decision (Mendez-Parra et al 2016; Lightfoot et al 2017).1   
 
The next section sets out a short account of the ways in which recent Conservative-
led/Conservative governments have approached foreign aid and international development 
                                                        
1 For Duncan Green’s analysis in the immediate aftermath of Brexit, see: 
http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/whats-the-likely-impact-of-brexit-on-development-aid-and-oxfam-any-
opportunities-amid-the-gloom/ 
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policy.2 The section that follows then examines in more detail their main stated rationales, 
as articulated within official aid policy documents, statements and speeches, with a focus on 
the interweaving claims about whether and how aid giving serves the UK’s ‘national 
interests’.3 
 
The Conservatives, UK aid and international development 
 
Within the Conservative Party – Ministers, MPs and members – there exist a range of views 
on the nature, purpose, value and effectiveness of foreign aid, and of the UK's proper role in 
the field of international development. Even so, since the founding of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) 
in 1960, official ODA contributions (when measured as a percentage of GNI) have always 
fallen under Conservative governments, sometimes slightly (e.g. 1970-74), sometimes more 
substantially (e.g. 1979-97).4 ODA fell under some Labour administrations too (1964-1970), 
but rose in other terms of office (1974-79; and notably over 1997-2010) (Barder 2005; Ireton 
2013). The Conservative’s 2009 Green Paper on international development (One World 
Conservatism: OWC) therefore signalled a significant change of perspective. OWC claimed 
that Labour governments wasted money, motivated by too much heart and not enough 
head, but said that they would do better, rather than retreat from the UK's commitments. It 
promised a more 'hard-headed' and 'value for money' approach which, it stated, would 
ensure that both British and partner country interests would be achieved. OWC committed a 
future Conservative government to meeting the 0.7% GNI target, something that New 
Labour had not actually achieved. This was widely seen as demonstrating a new cross-party 
consensus on foreign aid and development, arising from an international context that 
included a renewed OECD-DAC and UN push on poverty reduction, notably through the 
Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Declaration process on greater aid 
effectiveness, strongly encouraged by a range of social and civil society voices, such as Make 
                                                        
2 This paper is concerned with official UK ODA and development policy, and not with non-state actors, 
such as NGOs, foundations, faith-based organisations, peer giving/lending platforms or individuals.   
3 The paper is based on several years of research on various aspects of international aid politics, and 
UK aid in particular. Specific projects include research into the growing emphasis on private sector-led 
development, and on financialisation (funded through a Leverhulme Fellowship). A current project is 
the DfID/UK aid-India transition (funded by a Cambridge Humanities Research Grant). These projects 
have been conducted through extensive analysis of speeches and documents (such as DfID policy 
papers and Hansard’s record of the International Development Committee meetings), and through a 
large number of interviews with past and present DfID and FCO staff, NGO representatives, and 
personnel in other development agencies.  
4 http://cf.owen.org/wp-content/uploads/UK-Aid-as-Share-GNI.png. Last accessed 4 July 2016. 
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Poverty History. Hulme and Fukuda-Parr (2009) argue that the late 1990s and first decade of 
the 2000s marked a sea change in international aid and development norms, launching a 
significant new consensus on poverty reduction as the objective of the global development 
community. The Conservative Green Paper reflected this, even as it aimed to distance itself 
from New Labour through various claims and techniques.  
 
When the Coalition came to power in 2010, Conservative MP Andrew Mitchell was 
appointed Secretary of State for International Development. The Liberal Democrats were 
represented by only one junior Minister in DfID, although Lynn Featherstone was widely 
seen as committed and effective in her role. Mitchell was an active and dedicated Minister 
who was influential in championing the role and status of DfID and UK aid (Heppell and 
Lightfoot 2012). He lost his position in 2012 due to a (controversial) scandal, and was 
replaced by Justine Greening, a Minister with a business and Treasury background. In the 
first Conservative-led Coalition government the support for foreign aid and British 
prominence in international development cannot therefore be attributed to pressure from 
the more progressive and socially-oriented Liberal Democrats (Hall-Matthews 2011).  
 
While OWC was not an exact blueprint for the Coalition’s aid policy after election, Glennie 
(2011) describes it as a serious statement of intent. In 2010 the new government announced 
that it would honour its promise that the UK would meet the 0.7% GNI UN target (which it 
did by 2014), and ring fence the international development budget (just under £11.5 billion 
in 2015). Foreign aid became one of only two spending areas protected from budget cuts. 
The other was the highly politically sensitive health budget; while more recently defence and 
the intelligence agencies have also seen greater protection. This was a quite remarkable 
decision, which took almost everyone by surprise, raising questions for some and provoking 
outright anger for others. Here it should be noted that ring-fencing the ODA budget is not 
the same as ring-fencing DfID’s budget. In 2014, some 14% of ODA was channelled outside 
of DfID, including through the FCO’s Prosperity Fund (now re-badged as the Cross-
Government Prosperity Fund) and the Conflict Pool (National Audit Office 2015). However, 
to date at least, DfID continues to manage the bulk of ODA, and unlike some of its peers (e.g. 
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand) it has survived - thus far - as an independent agency. 
 
One explanation for aid generosity is domestic image – particularly given concerns 
expressed before the 2010 election by the then shadow Home Secretary Theresa May, that 
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the Conservatives needed to shed their image as the ‘nasty party’. Julie Gallagher (2009, 
2011) has detailed the ways in which Tony Blair sought to project his image as a moral 
leader and statesman through the UK's international development profile, notably in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, such positive image building through a commitment to aid 
requires that a reasonable share of the domestic audience approve of the UK's development 
efforts, policy directions and narratives. During New Labour's terms of office there were 
criticisms and controversies (Marriage 2006; Taylor 2012), but it was a period of confident 
economic expansion and very active (if obviously contested) global engagement. The Blair 
and Brown years coincided with the launch of the Millennium Development Goals, the Make 
Poverty History campaign, and strong campaigns by faith-based movements, amongst 
others; and with the growth of popular celebrity developmentalism (Brockington 2014; 
Richey 2015). The UK’s rich and vocal network of development organisations – think tanks, 
NGOs and academics amongst others – have been active in raising awareness and 
advocating for development issues with the general public, the private sector, and 
parliamentarians. Heppell and Lightfoot (2012) suggest that the early embrace of 
international development was partly an attempt to signal ‘compassionate Conservatism’. 
But while many within the UK development community praised these governments for their 
ongoing commitments to international development, Prime Minister Cameron increasingly 
confronted a more complex national mood. Surveys attempting to measure public attitudes 
to development and/or to foreign aid are complex (Glennie et al 2012), and there are good 
reasons to be cautious about the rigour and credibility of some, or to assume that domestic 
economic contraction automatically reduces willingness to provide international assistance. 
Nonetheless, a review of a number of recent surveys suggests that public support for official 
UK contributions to international development is in decline.5 A 2014 Chatham House-
YouGov survey found that: 
 
Although 30% of voters would hold aid spending at current levels, over half (54%) of 
voters agree with the statement that the UK ‘spends too much on aid. In difficult 
economic times we should spend more money at home.’ The percentage rises to 
62% among Conservative voters and 87% among UKIP voters, demonstrating the 
policy’s unpopularity on the right of the electorate where the Conservatives are 
under pressure to defend their share of the vote from an ascendant UKIP.6 
                                                        
5 Individual public generosity may remain high – it is important to delink these two phenomena.  
6 Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/15957. Last accessed 4 July 2016. 
One of UKIP’s popular electoral commitments is that it will drastically cut ODA, 
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Unlike Blair, Brown and Cameron, Theresa May had not shown any particular personal or 
political investment in foreign aid or international development before her commitment to 
the 0.7% target in April 2017. Indeed, her choice as Secretary of State for International 
Development, Priti Patel - someone who has been a tough critic of aid - appeared to signal a 
more hostile position, and perhaps the end of the cross-party consensus. Although Patel for 
the moment may have to commit to the 0.7% target, she had previously insinuated that she 
would not be driven by it. In the meantime, it is notable that Patel has robustly accelerated 
the ‘national interest’ agenda and narrative. She has announced significant increases to 
funding for the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC); announced that more UK 
ODA will be spent through Departments other than DfID, notably the Prosperity Fund; and is 
ever more strident in her insistence on the value of trade and investment as a development 
strategy, and the role that aid can play in leveraging this.  
 
All three Conservative-led/Conservative governments have faced robust criticism from 
sections of the Party, the media and the public for their foreign aid commitments. The Daily 
Mail, for example, has led a vitriolic and sustained campaign against UK foreign aid. It 
articulates two main critiques: first, that aid is wasted in a variety of ways (e.g. corruption, 
supposedly ‘daft’ schemes, and aid going to countries like India which have domestic wealth 
and capacity); and second, that there is compelling need within the UK that should be given 
priority over spending abroad. Here the Mail runs into a dilemma given its equally if not 
more vitriolic campaign against many sections of Britain’s poorest (‘shirkers’, ‘benefit cheats’ 
and so on), so it tends to focus on shortfalls in NHS funding, or more ‘deserving’ UK citizens. 
In 2014 the Mail led a campaign to re-direct foreign aid towards the thousands of people 
badly affected by severe flooding in South West England, gathering over 230,000 signatures 
in a parliamentary petition in three days alone, and generating considerable media debate 
(Tucket 2015).7 The Mail’s impact should not be under-estimated - a number of DfID 
personnel interviewed over 2016/2017, wearily said that every decision was now framed by 
‘how will the Daily Mail present this’. Media criticism is not limited to the tabloids: The 
Sunday Telegraph8 and Economist magazine9 both frequently carry articles criticising various 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.ukip.org/ukip_has_reaffirmed_its_commitment_to_cutting_the_foreign_aid_budget_by
_9_billion. Last accessed 4 July 2016. 
7 For example: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2559863/230-000-join-Mail-call-use-UKs-
11billion-foreign-aid-budget- tackle-floods-crisis.html Last accessed 28 June 2016. 
8 For example: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/10050587/We-need-honesty-
onforeign-aid-notring-fencing.html. Last accessed 28 June 2016. 
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aspects of aid. Even supporters have expressed concern about the disjuncture between a 
protected foreign aid budget and massive cuts to social welfare given rising levels of poverty 
in the UK.10 Successive Conservative governments are acutely aware of these views, and the 
next section examines in detail how Conservative champions of foreign aid have sought to 
explain and defend it to different constituencies through recourse to an elevated insistence 
on the national interest, and accompanying policy changes.  
 
Conservative support for foreign aid and the ‘national interest’  
 
Surveys and studies repeatedly show that public understandings of aid in the UK are 
dominated by the construction of it as ‘charity’: whether this is considered to be noble 
(benefitting poor people in poor countries) or naïve (wastefully benefitting corrupt leaders, 
business people and bureaucrats). This is an attitude that enrols a longer imperial and post-
imperial mind set (Duffield and Hewitt 2009; Noxolo 2012). At a global policy and 
governance level, since the late 1990s/early 2000s, the anti-poverty and aid effectiveness 
agenda has strongly promoted principles and mechanisms by which donors are meant to 
eschew narrow self-interest. Critical scholars, on the other hand, have for decades revealed 
the multiple ways in which foreign aid and development programmes have served various 
geopolitical and economic interests of donors.11 In some cases, these have been implicated 
                                                                                                                                                              
9 For example: http://www.economist.com/news/international/21700323-development-aid-best-
spent-poor-well-governed-countries-isnt-where-it. Last accessed 28 June 2016. 
10 Some analysts seem to reject this question purely on the basis that it is being asked by the Daily 
Mail, a right wing, populist tabloid newspaper. But it is a legitimate question to ask. This paper does 
not address the moral politics of aid in a context of enduring poverty in Britain (pre-dating the 
financial crisis, of course, but worsening under the last three governments). My short response would 
be that poverty in Britain is not caused by UK commitments to overseas aid, and nor would it be 
improved if foreign aid spending were to be reduced or cut. The causes of poverty in the UK are 
structural, created by past and present policy choices that impact on gendered, generational, 
regional, classed and ethnic (amongst others) inequalities and injustices. For a thoughtful analysis of 
UKIP and the Daily Mail’s campaigns against foreign aid, and the sense of political abandonment felt 
by many working class men and women, see Tucket (2015). 
11 Something that I have heard regularly from friends and colleagues around the world is the 
assumption that British aid is at least partly stimulated by guilt or reparation for British colonial 
domination, violence and exploitation; or by the UK’s more recent part in destabilising Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the consequences there and elsewhere. Regrettably, there is no evidence that guilt is 
motivating the current official provision of UK aid. Indeed, in the 2009 Green Paper, the Empire is 
invoked with some pride (Noxolo 2012; see also Biccum 2005 on earlier iterations), while at no point 
have David Cameron, Justine Greening, Priti Patel or any official UK development-humanitarian 
spokesperson on the refugee crisis or the situation in Syria, for example, framed aid in terms of 
reparation for the UK’s foreign policy misadventures. While there are plenty of claims around the 
morality of aid, these are couched in terms of 'doing right', and not as historical obligations or 
acknowledgement of guilt for more recent disastrous policy decisions.  
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in destabilisation and conflict, facilitated neo-imperial extractivist regimes, propped up 
unsavoury allies, and eased the roll-out of neoliberal economic policies that have primarily 
served transnational capitalist elites (Rist 1997; Sogge 2002). But supporters of aid from 
across the ideological spectrum have also claimed a variety of ways in which foreign aid and 
international development policies and programmes legitimately act in donor interests. 
These include claims to a series of direct benefits: for example, that donor and recipient 
country citizens will benefit from prosperous and stable countries able to expand business 
with each other; and more diffuse global public goods – where aid supports, for example, 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, or aims to prevent potential health pandemics, or 
contribute to peace and security (Hulme 2016). While aid has all too often been tainted in its 
motivations and outcomes, there is nothing inherently contradictory in principle about ‘win-
win’ outcomes or the mutual value of global public goods.  
 
In the last few years there has been a palpable shift in official aid discourse across most, if 
not all, DAC donors, with DfID a leading example of a significantly more assertive and explicit 
discourse of foreign aid acting in ‘national self-interest(s)’ (Breman 2011). The reasons for 
this include the election of a series of right wing governments, growing populism and public 
discontent, the economic downturns that have followed the global financial crisis and 
Eurozone crisis, and an increasing sense of competition with the ‘rising powers’ (Mawdsley 
2015a). In what follows, I examine the deepening efforts of Conservative champions of aid 
to justify expenditure in a time of austerity through reference to a variety of UK interests, 
namely soft power, global public goods, British economic interests, and security. Each one is 
claimed to represent a ‘win-win’ scenario for the UK and its partners. 
 
First, all three Conservative-led/Conservative governments have identified UK soft power as 
an explicit benefit of foreign aid. The 2015 UK Aid policy (titled ‘Tackling Global Challenges in 
the National Interest, and authored by HM Treasury as well as DFID) states: 
 
UK leadership in [tackling poverty] will cement our global moral leadership, and 
make a strong contribution to the UK’s soft power and our ability to project our 
influence across the globe (p.18).12  
 
                                                        
12 HM Treasury and DFID (2015) UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strat
egy_final_web_0905.pdf 
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DfID is widely admired by its peers in the industry as one of the world's leading development 
agencies (Morrissey 2002; Webster 2008; OECD 2010). It is large and relatively well funded - 
in 2016 the UK was the second largest contributor of foreign aid in absolute terms, and the 
5th largest in terms of share of national income amongst OECD-DAC members, excluding the 
EU. Just as importantly, since its establishment in 1997, DfID has consistently sought to 
provide normative leadership at the international level. International development is a 
foreign policy arena within which the UK has been able to project itself, shaping debates and 
promoting UK interests and agendas. For example, in two Multilateral Aid Reviews (MARs), 
DfID has pursued a more open agenda of (stated) British national interests. As well as long-
established multilateral institutions, such as UN agencies, the OECD-DAC and Bretton Woods 
Organisations, there is a suite of newer and potentially highly strategic international forums 
and institutions opening up, with ‘rising power’ membership a key threat/incentive to join 
and assert influence. For example, the UK manoeuvred hard for Justine Greening to be one 
of the three Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 
established in 2011. In this the UK was successful, and in the GPEDC’s formative phase, the 
UK represented the ‘established’ donors with the two other Co-Chairs coming from Nigeria 
and Indonesia. In 2012 the Secretary General of the UN established a High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, appointing David Cameron as one 
of the three Co-Chairs, together with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia and President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia. These positions and others like them enable UK 
leaders, diplomats and civil servants to project direct and indirect influence over 
international norms, debates and policy statements.13 Were DfID to be downgraded and/or 
the aid budget to be substantially reduced, the UK would lose some of this external profile 
and leverage. Domestically, however, the UK government must contend with a national-
international disconnect. There is good evidence that a majority of the UK general public 
have very little awareness of what DIFD is, or what it does (Glennie et al 2012). The soft 
power rationale is more evident to government, policy and some business circles, but has 
limited purchase on the attitudes of the voting public (Otter 2003). 
 
Second are global public goods, contributions to which can be framed as enlightened self-
interest. This is the intent to achieve outcomes such as climate change mitigation, human 
security, environmental sustainability, disease control, livelihoods and opportunities, good 
governance and so on in poor countries, with the primary or at least collateral outcome of 
                                                        
13 This doesn’t always mean the UK gets its way, of course. It was frustrated in efforts to shape the 
formation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in particular ways, for example.  
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reducing threats to and/or increasing UK interests. Current debates about global public 
goods in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals, for example, attempt to harness 
the potential alignments between national interests and the need to tackle global poverty, 
inequality and unsustainability (Hulme 2016). Classic examples include efforts to prevent the 
spread of communicable diseases, which in theory is good for those populations and 
countries at immediate risk, and good for a UK population at home and abroad who are at 
risk from epidemic outbreaks in a globalized world. This claim to enlightened self-interest is 
strongly made in the 2015 Aid Policy. The introduction by George Osborne and Justine 
Greening concludes: “With this new strategy, Britain can be proud to be a country that not 
only meets its responsibilities to the world’s poorest, but in doing so best serves and 
protects its own security and interests” (UK Aid 2015: 4), and each of the four strategic 
objectives is couched in terms of helping others and benefitting the UK. This is not to say, of 
course, that these issues are well-handled. In the case of communicable diseases, for 
example, the enduring donor (state and major foundations) neglect - in some cases active 
dismantling - of comprehensive public healthcare systems continues to undermine 
meaningful and long term health transitions in many places (Biesma 2009; McGoey 2015). 
Claims to enlightened self-interest, it hardly need be said, can also conceal or gloss less 
worthy motivations. But leaving aside actual or intended outcomes, it is not politically 
implausible that the Conservative government would recognise the genuine national 
benefits of some forms of (supposedly progressive) global interventions (Sumner and Tribe 
2011; Hulme 2016). Economic globalisation, transnational crime and climate change have all 
contributed to a growing acknowledgement that it is in the UK's interests to engage actively 
with these and other global issues, providing a credible explanation for some element of the 
Conservative governments’ commitments to international development efforts.  
 
Third, there are powerful economic rationalities for foreign aid (Essex 2014; Roberts 2015). 
This is not new - ODA has always served economic ends and interests, and to be clear, these 
are not inherently at odds with recipient interests. However, donor economic interests may 
not align with the goals of inclusive development, but result in short term profit-making, 
limited and unsustainable domestic economic linkages, extractive regimes, capital flight and 
so on. In the past, UK ODA was used illicitly to massage deals, the Pergau Dam in Malaysia 
being one particularly infamous example (Lankester 2013).14 Tied aid allowed donors to 
                                                        
14 At the insistence of Margaret Thatcher and her Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, UK aid was used to 
fund the controversial Pergau Dam in Malaysia in order to secure a major arms deal. It was later 
found to have been an unlawful decision.  
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make sure their firms benefitted from the domestic goods and services purchased through 
ODA. At a policy level, donor power within the institutions of global governance has enabled 
them to shape international policies (for example on the debt crisis and trade) in ways that 
protect and serve the interests of the powerful economies, for example in relation to capital 
controls and global tax norms. Under New Labour, and more broadly across the OECD-DAC 
members in the late 1990s and 2000s, some of these economic interests – many of which 
evidently clash with the aims of promoting poverty reduction and international 
development – became the subject of discussion and partial reform. The UK took the strong 
step of eliminating all tied aid in the 2002 International Development Act. Internationally, 
the Paris process sought to improve aid effectiveness, including by urging donors not to 
advance their own economic interests at the expense of recipient needs (OECD 2005). But 
while some progress was made, donors often fell short of full reform. Although the UK has 
performed better than many of its peers, it has been noted that British firms continue to win 
the vast majority of DfID contracts.15  
 
The Conservative governments under discussion have emphatically embraced the idea of 
promoting economic growth as a core engine of development (Mawdsley 2015b). In 2013 
DfID announced the creation of a new Director General for Economic Development, and 
released a Strategic Framework on economic development in 2014.16 Partnerships with the 
private sector are central to this vision (McGoey 2014), and in 2011 DfID created a new 
Private Sector Department. DfID is in tune with what appears to be a wider geo-economic 
turn in international development: the support that ODA can provide for donor firms and 
economic interests, for example through export credits, and by helping to de-risk expansion 
into ‘frontier markets’ (Carroll and Jarvis 2014), is now explicitly asserted as positive for all 
stakeholders. For example, Justine Greening was the first Secretary of State for International 
Development who has led a trade delegation, in this case to Tanzania. About this she said: 
 
                                                        
15 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2012/sep/21/why-is-uk-aid-going-to-
uk-companies. Last accessed 4 July 2016. See also Mark Tran “DfID's aid spend on contractors comes 
under scrutiny”, The Guardian, Friday 17 May 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/may/17/DfID-aid-contractors-scrutiny (accessed 6 March 2015). 
16 DfID, “Economic Development for Shared Prosperity and Poverty Reduction: A Strategic Frame- 
work” (2014), available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/276859/Econ-
development-strategic-framework_.pdf 
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As a British Minister I make no apology for flying the flag in these frontier markets. 
My Department should be flying the flag like every other bit of government.17 
 
The economic benefit to the UK - while claiming positive outcomes for poorer people and 
partner countries - is one of the key ways in which all three Conservative governments have 
insisted that UK foreign aid acts ‘firmly in the national interest’. While this paper does not 
assess these claims in depth, we can note three critical responses. The first comes from 
Glennie et al (2012), who suggest that the ‘British self-interest’ message may in fact not 
appeal strongly to large sections of the public, who instead continue to frame aid in moral 
terms. Second are those critics who ask whether these policies are indeed having positive 
impacts on poverty reduction and development, or whether they are simply contributing to 
uneven and unsustainable growth within partner countries, with little or no benefit tricking 
down to poorer people or places (Tomlinson 2012). The third comes from Murray and 
Overton (2016), who unpack the ‘national’ in ‘national interest’. They observe that in New 
Zealand and beyond, including the UK,18 ODA is increasingly being directed towards the 
corporate and financial sectors. In other words, ODA is contributing to dual domestic 
economic strategies: austerity for the majority (and most harshly, the poor and 
marginalised), while providing quantitative easing, export credits and de-risking for the 
corporate sector. Murray and Overton (2016) suggest that some parts of the ODA portfolio 
are being used to contribute to ‘stimulus’ packages directed upwards, while cuts are 
directed downwards. Where this departs from previous decades of tied aid and economic 
self-interest is in the shift in sectoral benefits. Earlier tied aid helped promote markets for 
British manufacturers, for example, of weapons or agricultural machinery. Leaving aside the 
ethics of this, in this era there was arguably a greater spread of benefits for British workers. 
Today’s aid is formally untied, but a greater share of ODA is being directed through 
management consultants and financial services firms (Mawdsley 2017). The economic 
benefits of foreign aid as stimulus are more likely to be dragged upwards by well-paid 
professionals and firms, and the profits off-shored. 
 
                                                        
17 Greening (2014) https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/smart-aid-why-its-all-about-jobs. Last 
accessed 5 July 2016. 
18 Mawdsley, E., Murray, W., Overton, J., Scheyvens, R. and Banks, G. “Exporting Stimulus and ’Shared 
Prosperity’: Re-Inventing Foreign Aid for a Retroliberal Era”, Working Paper (New Zealand Aid and 
Development Dialogues, 2015), available: <at http://nzadds.org.nz/> 
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Finally, an enduring claim to national interest is based on security. As with the economic 
agenda outlined above, ODA has long served geopolitical ends – that is, the primary or 
collateral aim to influence foreign affairs in ways that support (presumed) ‘national’ security 
and other foreign policy interests. The subservience (although never complete dominance) 
of foreign aid in Cold War geopolitical contestation has been analysed in depth (e.g. Simpson 
2008), while other long-standing and more recent geopolitical contexts and drivers of aid 
policies include UK support for ‘friendly’ regimes in the Middle East, development activities 
in Afghanistan, and other ‘post-conflict’ sites of strategic interest (e.g. Waddell 2006; 
Duffield 2007; Curtis 2013). All three Conservative governments have made strong and 
unapologetic statements about foreign aid being used in British security interests, although 
always with the accompanying claim that it is also doing ‘good’ for those communities and 
countries being targeted. In 2010 the government created a National Security Council, 
comprised of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
and as junior partner, the Department for International Development (DfID).19 The first of 
the four strategic objectives listed in the 2015 Aid Strategy is: 
Strengthening global peace, security and governance: the government will invest 
more to tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict, and to tackle crime 
and corruption. This is fundamental to poverty reduction overseas, and will also 
strengthen our own national security at home.  
Again, while not new, recent Conservative governments have deepened the security-
development aid nexus, and pushed this message very strongly. In 2015, for example, in his 
high-profile Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech, David Cameron announced that 50% of DFID’s 
budget must be allocated to developing ‘fragile and failing states’ as part of a ‘full spectrum’ 
response to the terrorist threats. The previous year this line of spending had come to 30% of 
DfID’s budget, requiring a significant (around £3.5 billion) allocation from elsewhere in its 
budget.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Conservative governments are currently subject to legislative requirements that they 
allocate 0.7% GNI as Overseas Development Assistance, but clearly this is not enough to 
                                                        
19 Whitehall politics are always more complicated than the formal institutional architecture may 
suggest. DfID’s relatively more secure budget gives it greater leverage in some contexts than might be 
at first apparent.  
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explain their commitment to what is a deeply unpopular policy for many of their supporters. 
The resolution to the apparent paradox is not in fact all that hard to identify. Under David 
Cameron, Andrew Mitchell, Justine Greening, and now Priti Patel and Theresa May, aid has 
been increasingly diverted and re-worked to serve more openly (so-called) ‘national 
interests’. Some of these are long-standing, but are adapting to new contexts. In the case of 
‘soft power’, for example, DfID has sought leading roles and influence within new forums 
opening up with the rising powers, multilaterally (for example, the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation) and bilaterally (for example, as it adjusts its 
relationships with India and China). Aid provides financial resources to tackle global public 
goods issues, ever more pressing in an increasingly globalised world. In security, ODA is a 
major source of the UK’s financing of domestic and overseas refugee spending in the fall out 
from the Syria crisis, for example. The accelerating and deepening relationship between aid 
and capital has been striking under recent Conservative governments. Using public money to 
escort private capital out to ‘frontier economies’ (Carroll and Jarvis 2014) and de-risk UK 
investment is entirely in keeping with bailouts for the banks and cuts to social services. 
Instruments include the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), the Prosperity 
Fund and a DfID increasingly tuned to promoting growth can act in support of neo-
mercantilist support for British firms and investors. It is significant that a higher proportion 
of ODA is being directed into other government departments, including defence, border 
forces, business and research.20 
 
In June 2016 Britain voted by a narrow margin to leave the EU. The UK is now entering a 
period of extraordinary, indeed chaotic, domestic politics. Theresa May is further to the right 
than Cameron, and the economic uncertainties of the Brexit process will put further 
pressure on the UK’s budget. Despite the rationales outlined above, which to different 
extents are aligned and compatible with Conservative agendas of domestic austerity and 
support for corporate/financial sectors, soft power and security interests, the UK ODA 
budget is highly vulnerable.21 For better or worse (and this paper has not attempted to ask 
whether the UK should give aid, or whether aid is effective in achieving poverty reduction 
                                                        
20 The recent establishment of the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), for example, has 
committed £1.5 billion of the ODA budget for (UK-dominated) research into ‘global challenges’. The 
jury is out on whether this will have structural, desirable, transformative and sustainable impacts on 
poor people in poor countries, but the jury is in on the benefits that will stream to UK universities and 
related institutions.  
21 For initial responses to what Brexit might mean for partners and recipients, trade and global 
development trends, see Owen Barder: http://www.cgdev.org/blog/brexit-threats-and-opportunities-
global-development. The ODI has also run events and publications. 
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and sustainable development, or indeed, of acting in narrow national interests), aid will 
continue to be a target for many critics. It is significant then, that in April 2017, Theresa May 
reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to the 0.7% target, amid a flurry of speculation that she 
would dispense with it, and a series of counter-interventions from the likes of Bill Gates and 
the President of the World Bank encouraging her to keep to it.22 The major tension arises 
from the substantial disconnect between public and influential media conceptions of what 
aid is and what it achieves, and the strategic purposes it actually serves. Foreign aid is not an 
'easy sell' given weak public and media understandings of the many ways in which aid works 
– soft power, economic advantage and geopolitical influence; and given the context of deep 
spending cuts in other parts of the national budget. Moreover, there is evidence from 
several contexts, including the UK (Glennie 2008) and Australia23, that scripting aid in ways 
that seem to put national interests first is not inevitably popular with the majority of voters. 
Successive Conservative-led and Conservative governments have appealed to the public’s 
moral/charitable instincts with reference to achievements in providing education, food and 
water (for example) for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable. But they have also 
increasingly explicitly attempted to persuade domestic audiences that aid works in the 
‘national interest(s)’, and indeed, have pursued policy and modality shifts in these 
directions. Whether Conservative champions can persuade the public, party and media that 
aid should and does work in their interests remains a pressing political question. 
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